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MORAL PANICS AND BODY CAMERAS 
HOWARD M. WASSERMAN

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Law often results from moral panic. Events occur that are perceived as 
a threat to the very fabric of society and lawmakers react, frequently with 
hastily created and ill-advised policy proposals designed to save society 
from an existential threat and touted to the public as doing so.
1
 Laws in 
areas such as child sexual abuse,
2
 child pornography,
3
 fetal protection,
4
 
financial regulation,
5
 and illegal drug use
6
 have been criticized as 
overreactions to moral panics, often because the laws represent solutions 
that are unsuited or wildly disproportionate to the actual problem, although 
sold to the public as an easy cure-all. 
The tragic events in Ferguson, Missouri in August 2014, and the 
proposed responses, bear some hallmarks of moral panic. The shooting of 
Michael Brown, an unarmed African-American teen, by Officer Darren 
Wilson, a white Ferguson police officer, triggered weeks of protests cum 
massive police resistance cum riots that turned the city into a present-day 
Birmingham.
7
 Clashes between demonstrators and police were captured 
on video, triggering conflicts over the First Amendment right of citizens to 
record police performing their official duties in public.
8
 At the time of this 
 
 
   Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. 
 1. Susan Bandes, The Lessons of Capturing the Friedmans: Moral Panic, Institutional Denial 
and Due Process, 3 J. LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. 293, 294 (2007); José Gabilondo, Financial Moral 
Panic! Sarbanes-Oxley, Financier Folk Devils, and Off-Balance-Sheet Arrangements, 36 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 781, 785 (2006). 
 2. Bandes, supra note 1, at 294, 300. 
 3. Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 231–32 
(2001). 
 4. Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws: Moral Panic and the New Constitutional 
Battlefront, 102 CAL. L. REV. 781, 805 (2014). 
 5. Gabilondo, supra note 1, at 785. 
 6. Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 40 (2010). 
 7. Josh Voorhees, Everything That Went Wrong in Ferguson, SLATE (Aug. 21, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/08/ferguson_police_timeline_a_compre
hensive_chronological_accounting_of_the.single.html. 
 8. Byron Tau, Missouri ACLU, Authorities Reach Agreement on Recording of Police, POLITICO 
(Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2014/08/missouri-aclu-authorities-
reach-agreement-on-recording-194043.html; Complaint at 1, Hussein v. County of St. Louis, No. 4:14-
cv-1410 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 14, 2014), available at http://ia802308.us.archive.org/10/items/gov.uscourts. 
moed.135195/gov.uscourts.moed.135195.1.0.pdf; see also Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: 
Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 652 (2009) (arguing for broad 
First Amendment liberty to record official police activity in public spaces). 
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Commentary’s publication, state and federal officials are investigating 
events,
9
 and prosecutions
10
 and civil actions
11
 of all stripes are 
contemplated or pending. 
But one significant policy suggestion has emerged from the 
controversy: equipping police officers with body cameras. If Ferguson 
officers had such cameras, the argument goes, we would know whether the 
Brown shooting was justified, and we would know whether Ferguson 
police overreacted to peaceful, constitutionally protected demonstrations 
or whether members of the public were engaged in violent rioting 
warranting forceful police response.
12
 Body cameras also may function as 
a counterweight to increasingly ubiquitous citizen recording of police-
citizen encounters.
13
 
It might seem odd to describe the body camera proposal as a hasty 
response to moral panic, on par with the rushed, ill-considered, and often 
unfounded prosecutions brought in response to bizarre tales of mass ritual 
child sexual abuse that we saw throughout the ‘80s and early ‘90s.
14
 
Expansive use of body cameras appears, on balance, to be good policy. It 
has overwhelming support from every stakeholder in the controversy—the 
 
 
 9. Amanda Sakuma & Zachary Roth, Ferguson Welcomes Federal Civil Rights Police 
Investigation, MSNBC (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/doj-open-civil-rights-
investigation-ferguson-police; Sari Horwitz et al., Justice Dept. to Probe Ferguson Police Force, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-to-
probe-ferguson-police-force/2014/09/03/737dd928-33bc-11e4-a723-fa3895a25d02_story.html; Cf. 42 
U.S.C. § 14141 (authorizing civil action by the Attorney General seeking equitable relief against law 
enforcement agencies over a “pattern or practice” of unconstitutional conduct).  
 10. Kate Levine, The Ultimate Conflict, SLATE (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/local_prosecutor_bob_mcculloch_should_not_be_the_one_ 
to_decide_whether_to.html; Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (establishing criminal liability for state and local 
officials who willfully deprive persons of constitutional rights). 
 11. Taylor Wofford, Ferguson Slapped with $40 Million Civil Rights Lawsuit, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 
29, 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/ferguson-slapped-40-million-civil-rights-lawsuit-267452; see 
Complaint, White v. Jackson, No. 4:14-cv-01490 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2014), available at https:// 
ia601400.us.archive.org/14/items/gov.uscourts.moed.135403/gov.uscourts.moed.135403.1.0.pdf. 
 12. German Lopez, How Body Cameras Could Change Police, VOX, Sept. 18, 2014, 
http://www.vox.com/2014/9/17/6113045/police-worn-body-cameras-explained; Justin T. Ready & 
Jacob T.N. Young, Three Myths About Police Body Cams, SLATE (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.slate. 
com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/09/ferguson_body_cams_myths_about_police_body_worn
_recorders.html. 
 13. Kirk Johnson, Today’s Police Put On a Gun and a Camera, The N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/us/todays-police-put-on-a-gun-and-a-camera.html?_r=0. 
 14. Bandes, supra note 1, at 293–94; Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children’s 
Susceptibility Research: A Critique, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1004, 1008, 1030 (1999). 
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public,
15
 the White House,
16
 federal legislators,
17
 police officials,
18
 police 
unions,
19
 and the American Civil Liberties Union.
20
  
The problem, instead, is the rhetoric surrounding the proposals. 
Supporters promote body cameras as a panacea; they are spoken of as the 
singularly effective solution to the problem, able to prevent “another 
Ferguson.” And the public perceives them as that comprehensive cure to 
the problem. Video tells us exactly what happened, entirely eliminates the 
he-said/he-said ambiguity that often characterizes police-citizen 
encounters, and deters misbehavior by police and citizens. 
Unfortunately, the reality is less certain. In so overstating the case, this 
rhetoric becomes indistinguishable from the rhetoric surrounding 
responses to past controversies that may be characterized as moral panics. 
This Commentary highlights the limits of body cameras and of video 
evidence generally. While body cameras are a good idea and police 
departments should be encouraged and supported in using them, it is 
nevertheless important not to see them as a magic bullet. The public 
discussion needs less absolute rhetoric and more open recognition of the 
limitations of this technology.  
 
 
 15. Mike Brown Law. Require All State, County, and Local Police to Wear a Camera, THE 
WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 13, 2014), https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/mike-brown-law-requires-all-
state-county-and-local-police-wear-camera/8tlS5czf (on-line White House petition garnered more than 
154,000 signatures) (last visited Sept. 26, 2014); Vidcie Survey Reveals 77 percent of Americans 
Would Feel Safer if Police Were Equipped with Body Mounted Cameras, KEYC NEWS 12, Aug. 21, 
2014, http://www.keyc.com/story/26340609/vidcie-survey-reveals-77-percent-of-americans-would-feel-
safer-if-police-were-equipped-with-body-mounted-cameras [hereinafter Vidcie Survey]. 
 16. Roy L. Austin, Jr., Response to Your Petition on the Use of Body-Worn Cameras, THE 
WHITE HOUSE https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/response/response-your-petition-use-body-worn-cameras 
(official White House response to petition). 
 17. Arthur Delaney, Adam Schiff Pushes Body Cameras for Cops, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 27, 
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/27/body-worn-cameras_n_5722762.html. 
 18. POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED (2014), available at http://www.policeforum.org/assets/ 
docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/implementing%20a%20body-worn%20camera%20program. 
pdf. 
 19. Doug Wyllie, Survey: Police Officers Want Body-Worn Cameras, POLICEONE (Oct. 23, 
2012), http://www.policeone.com/police-products/body-cameras/articles/6017774-Survey-Police-officers 
-want-body-worn-cameras/. 
 20. JAY STANLEY, ACLU, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN PLACE, 
A WIN FOR ALL (Oct. 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/police_body-mounted_ 
cameras.pdf. 
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II. MORAL PANIC 
Sociologist Stanley Cohen defined moral panics:  
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to 
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature 
is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass 
media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, 
politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited 
experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are 
evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, 
submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. . . . Sometimes 
the panic passes over and is forgotten . . . ; at other times it has more 
serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such 
changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way 
society conceives itself.
21
 
Moral panics often produce legal responses, whether in the form of 
punishment of the “deviants” whose behaviors threaten society or in the 
form of prospective policy changes designed to prevent recurrence of the 
deviant behavior.  
As one commentator describes the process from moral panic, 
[A]n incident or pattern catalyzes preexisting social anxiety and an 
ad hoc issues movement is born. The media fans the flames through 
sensationalist and reductionist news stories   . . . Usually, a hasty 
legal reform results from the panic. Driven as it is by irrationality, 
the reforms usually miss the point of the original problem and suffer 
from disproportionality.
22
 
These reforms often reflect broad consensus. As society’s elites coalesce 
around the idea that some problem poses an existential threat to their 
values and interests and demands a response, they also coalesce around 
one bold quick-fix solution, endorsed as the comprehensive answer to the 
problem, even if that solution is rushed, not fully considered, and often 
ineffective.
23
  
Of course, it may be quite difficult to separate moral panic from 
legitimate response to serious wrongdoing. Often moral panic is 
recognized only in retrospect, when, with the benefit of time, 
 
 
 21. STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS 1 (3d ed. 2002). 
 22. Gabilondo, supra note 1, at 792. 
 23. Bandes, supra note 1, at 298–99; Gabilondo, supra note 1, at 792. 
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policymakers either rethink past laws and punishments that were adopted 
in haste, or learn the lessons of history and respond to new events without 
the panicked search for quick fixes.
24
 More importantly, perspective may 
matter. Where some observers see legitimate response to truthful 
allegations of large-scale wrongdoing, others see moral panic.
25
 Like 
obscenity, there is an unfortunate “I know it when I see it”
26
 quality to the 
concept. 
III. BODY CAMERAS AS MORAL PANIC RESPONSE 
Do responses to the events in Ferguson, Missouri in August 2014—the 
shooting of Michael Brown, the widespread protests that followed, and the 
massive police resistance to those protests—reflect a moral panic? It may 
be too early to say, because we do not know how issues will be resolved in 
the courts or what policy will emerge from the entire controversy. At the 
time of this Commentary’s publication, state and federal investigations, 
civil and criminal, remain ongoing—examining the original shooting of 
Brown, the subsequent protests and police responses to them, and general 
practices and policies of the Ferguson police.
27
 Civil rights lawsuits by 
arrested protesters have been filed or are in the works.
28
 Daily public 
protests continue more than three months after the initial events. And 
everyone is preparing for a new round of mass demonstrations and 
protests, and anticipating them turning violent, should a state grand jury 
decline to indict Wilson.
29
 
Ferguson became a flashpoint for broader concerns about police 
misconduct, unreasonable force, racial justice, the role of public spaces for 
First Amendment activity, and how police respond to public First 
Amendment activity. And the controversy shared some characteristics 
with moral panics—pervasive and excited 24/7 media coverage,
30
 searches 
for magic policy solutions, and public pressure to prosecute wrongdoers,
31
 
which in Ferguson has included calls to replace the county prosecutor with 
 
 
 24. Bandes, supra note 1, at 299. 
 25. Id. at 300–01. 
 26. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 27. Supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
 28. Supra note 10. 
 29. Howard Wasserman, Inevitable Conflict and the State of the First Amendment, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 17, 2014), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/11/inevitable-conflict 
-and-the-state-of-the-first-amendment.html.  
 30. Gabilondo, supra note 1, at 792–93. 
 31. Bandes, supra note 1, at 296, 298–99. 
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someone, likely a federal prosecutor, perceived as more willing and likely 
to vigorously pursue charges.
32
 
The interesting twist is that there is virtually universal agreement that 
genuine wrongdoing occurred in Ferguson; the disagreement goes to what 
that wrongdoing was. Some observers see the unjustified shooting of an 
unarmed African-American teen by a white police officer who had 
unnecessarily initiated physical contact over a de minimis matter of 
walking in the street; others see the wrongful tarnishing of a good police 
officer’s reputation for doing his job under difficult conditions, as well as 
a victim with a possibly criminal past who had recently robbed a 
convenience store and violently resisted the officer. Some observers see 
rioting and threats to social order and peace; others see constitutionally 
protected peaceful demonstrations calling attention to a pattern of 
racialized police abuses to which a militarized police force overreacted, 
thereby illustrating the very racialized police abuses the citizens were 
protesting. 
But as in past moral panics, overwhelming consensus has coalesced 
around a single specific policy recommendation promoted and understood 
as the singular way to prevent “another Ferguson”: equipping police 
officers with body cameras. More than seventy-five percent of respondents 
in one survey supported body cameras as an appropriate policy response to 
these events.
33
 The idea has the support of law enforcement and the 
American Civil Liberties Union. An online White House petition called 
for federal legislation mandating body cameras for all state and local law 
enforcement,
34
 and the White House responded by touting the role of body 
cameras in federal grant programs and a recent consent decree with the 
New Orleans Police Department.
35
 Police departments across the country 
have implemented or are considering purchasing this technology.
36
  
The question is whether broad adoption of body cameras is—like most 
responses to moral panic—another hasty and disproportionate reaction that 
misses the point of the problem, or at least not the complete solution that 
proponents suggest and the public hopes. Cameras and the video they 
provide, the argument goes, would have told us—clearly, neutrally, 
 
 
 32. Levine, supra note 10; but see Howard Wasserman, Federal Control of All Police 
Prosecutions?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 12, 2014), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/09/ 
limits-on-federal-involvement.html. 
 33. Vidcie Survey, supra note 15. 
 34. Mike Brown Law, supra note 15. 
 35. Austin, supra note 16. 
 36. POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 18, at 1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/10
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certainly, and without question or ambiguity—what happened in the 
Brown shooting and what happened in the subsequent protests. Supporters 
reflexively insist that body cameras offer three broad benefits: (1) they 
will produce objective, unambiguous evidence revealing what happened in 
future police-citizen encounters; (2) knowing they are being recorded and 
that the recording may be used as evidence will deter misconduct and 
prompt police and the public to behave better; and, as a result, (3) there 
will be fewer citizen complaints, less constitutional litigation, and greater 
accuracy in any litigation that does arise.  
Cameras may well produce some or all of those benefits. The problem 
is one of rhetoric—the idea and perception of body cameras as panacea, as 
a comprehensive, unambiguous solution to future incidents of alleged 
misconduct in police–public encounters. As always, the issue is more 
complicated and the solution less certain than public conversation 
recognizes or acknowledges. Even if everyone agrees that widespread 
adoption of body cameras is a good idea, the surrounding rhetoric and 
expectations must remain realistic and open about the technology, its true 
benefits, and its very real limitations. 
IV. THE LIMITS OF BODY CAMERAS 
Having considered the arguments for body cameras, we consider their 
limits and why they may not offer the complete answer that proponents 
expect or suggest. 
A. Unknown Effects and Unintended Consequences 
We can only speculate whether recording will deter bad behavior and 
incentivize good behavior by police and the public. The technology and its 
use by actual police are too new to know its true effects. 
Two studies offer some preliminary answers. The first examined a pilot 
program in Mesa, Arizona, in which 50 officers were given cameras and 
fifty were not. The study made three key findings: (1) Camera-equipped 
officers conducted “significantly” fewer stop-and-frisks and made 
significantly fewer arrests than their non-camera-equipped colleagues; 
(2) camera-equipped officers wrote more tickets and citations; and 
(3) camera-equipped officers were more likely to initiate contact with 
citizens on the street, but less likely than non-camera-equipped colleagues 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to respond to dispatched calls.
37
 In fact, the percentage difference in stop-
and-frisks between the groups was larger than the actual percentage of 
stop-and-frisks by the camera-equipped officers.
38
 Mesa also saw fewer 
total complaints against officers with cameras and nearly three times as 
many complaints against officers without cameras.
39
 
A second study examined camera use in the Rialto Police Department 
in California. It found that, when wearing cameras, officers were less 
likely to use weapons and less likely to initiate physical contact with 
suspects, doing so only when physically threatened; when not wearing 
cameras, officers were more likely to initiate physical contact and more 
likely to use force even when not physically threatened. The study 
similarly found a significant reduction in citizen complaints and use-of-
force incidents compared with the previous twelve months.
40
 
The question is what to conclude from such studies. Perhaps they 
confirm what supporters hope: when wearing body cameras, officers are 
more proactive, more risk-averse, and more willing to avoid invasive or 
forceful strategies except where necessary. They think more carefully 
about whether they have sufficient cause to stop and frisk or arrest before 
initiating citizen encounters.
41
 They also are more cautious about using 
force, although less cautious about non-invasive actions, such as issuing 
citations. And the effects carry to citizens, who are less likely to proceed 
with questionable complaints, knowing that video evidence undermines 
their version of events. On the other hand, the presence of cameras (from 
media and camera-toting observers) during the Ferguson demonstrations 
seems to not have deterred demonstrators or police from apparent 
misconduct. And the deterrence argument is thrown into serious question 
by the seemingly regular flow of new videos, captured by camera-wielding 
witnesses, showing apparent police misconduct, typically unreasonable 
force or attempts to skirt constitutional limitations on their authority to 
stop, search, and seize members of the public.
42
 Of course, even knowing 
 
 
 37. Justin T. Ready & Jacob T.N. Young, The Impact of on-Officer Video Cameras on Police-
Citizen Contacts: Findings from the Mesa Field Experiment 21–22, 24–25 (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author); Ready & Young, supra note 12.  
 38. Ready & Young, supra note 37, at 22. 
 39. POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 18, at 6. 
 40. Self-Awareness to Being Watched and Socially-Desirable Behavior: A Field Experiment on 
the Effect of Body-Worn Cameras on Police Use-of-Force 8–9, POLICE FOUNDATION, http://www. 
policefoundation.org/content/body-worn-camera; Implementing, supra note 18, at 5. 
 41. Ready & Young, supra note 37, at 24. 
 42. See, e.g., Andres Jauregui, NYPD Appears to Slam Pregnant Woman Sandra Amezquita to 
Ground, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/24/nypd-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/10
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that cameras are present does not mean people will not sometimes do 
unwise things. The point is that the deterrent effect may not be as great as 
many hope. 
Moreover, there may be an unintended negative consequence to the 
increased transparency that cameras provide—overdeterrence. As 
organizational-behavior scholar Ethan Bernstein explains, knowing that 
they are being recorded and evaluated based on the recording, “workers 
are likely to do only what is expected of them, slavishly adhering to even 
the most picayune protocols.”
43
 Bernstein found that assembly-line 
workers avoided creative time-saving devices or training methods, instead 
adhering rigidly to precise written policies, fearing having to explain 
themselves to anyone watching the video.
44
 
In the policing context, overdeterrence means “sacrificing the kind of 
educated risk-taking and problem solving that's often needed to save 
lives.”
45
 Police officers steer well clear of the constitutional line out of 
fear of having to explain or justify behavior that, while not 
unconstitutional, may look questionable on video. These same concerns 
justify qualified immunity in constitutional litigation, under which 
executive officials are protected from suit so long as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
officer would have been aware. Immunity provides officers breathing 
space; it ensures that they do not perform their official functions less 
vigorously or with “unwarranted timidity” and that they do not forego 
potentially beneficial policing strategies out of fear of personal liability.
46
 
 
 
pregnant-woman-video-sandra-amezquita_n_5872286.html; Ben Mathis-Lilley, “I’m Not Your 
Brother,” Says Officer Tasering Black Minnesota Man in Front of His Children, SLATE (Aug. 29, 
2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2014/08/29/minnesota_taser_video_christopher_lollie_ 
of_st_paul_tased_in_front_of_children.html; Daniel Politi, Video: New York State Officer Appears to 
Slap Man Who Didn’t Want Car Searched, SLATE (Nov. 9, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/ 
the_slatest/2014/11/09/saratoga_country_officer_appears_to_slap_man_who_didn_t_want_car_search
ed.html; Annie-Rose Strasser, Man Dies After Being Put in Choke-Hold by NYPD, THINKPROGRESS 
(July 18, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/07/18/3461602/nypd-choke-hold-man-dies/; 
Howard Wasserman, Determining the Effect of Video, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 8, 2014), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/07/determining-the-effect-of-video.html. 
 43. Ethan Bernstein, How Being Filmed Changes Employee Behavior, HARVARD BUSINESS 
REVIEW BLOG NETWORK (Sept. 12, 2014), http://blogs.hbr.org/2014/09/how-being-filmed-changes-
employee-behavior/ (emphasis in original). 
 44. Id.; see also Ethan Bernstein, The Transparency Trap, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2014, 
available at http://hbr.org/2014/10/the-transparency-trap/ar/4. 
 45. Bernstein, supra note 43. 
 46. Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1665 (2012); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009). 
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Given the expansion of qualified immunity in recent years,
47
 it would be 
ironic (although not necessarily a negative) if police departments widely 
adopt a practice that creates the very overdeterrence that qualified 
immunity is designed to avoid. 
B. Limits of Video Evidence 
More problematic is the insistence that body cameras will provide 
video evidence that is always an objective, neutral, certain, and 
unambiguous representation of what happened in an encounter, leaving no 
doubts and no he-said/he-said disputes. Unfortunately, and contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s insistence, video does not “speak for itself.”
48
 
First, as any undergraduate film student knows, what video actually 
says depends on a number of different considerations—who and what is 
depicted, who created the images and how, and details of the images 
themselves (length, clarity, lighting, distance, angle, scope, steadiness, 
manner of shooting, quality); these affect the inferences that viewers draw 
from video, allowing for many different possible meanings and 
conclusions.
49
 Second, as Dan Kahan and his co-authors showed, what any 
viewer “sees”—and the inferences and conclusions she draws—are 
influenced by the viewer’s cultural, demographic, social, political, and 
ideological characteristics.
50
 Video speaks “only against the background 
of preexisting understandings of social reality that invest those facts with 
meaning.”
51
 
Two of Kahan’s studies are especially pertinent in thinking about body 
cameras and video. One study tested whether viewers saw use of force (an 
officer intentionally ramming his car into a fleeing car to end a high-speed 
chase) as constitutionally excessive; it found division along political and 
ideological attitudes.
52
 A second study found that viewers’ opinions about 
abortion rights tracked whether they saw a video of events outside a 
 
 
 47. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (stating that qualified immunity protects 
“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 48. Compare Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 n.5 (2007) with Wasserman, supra note 8, at 
624–25. 
 49. Wasserman, supra note 8, at 618–21, 624–26; Howard M. Wasserman, Video Evidence and 
Summary Judgment: The Procedure of Scott v. Harris, 91 JUDICATURE 180, 182–83 (2008). 
 50. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of 
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 879 (2009); see also Wasserman, supra note 8, at 627. 
 51. Kahan et al., supra note 50, at 883. 
 52. Id. at 841. 
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reproductive health clinic as depicting peaceful assembly and protest or 
unlawful and violent attempts to blockade that clinic.
53
 
Both questions—whether some force was excessive and whether a 
gathering was peaceful protest or lawless riot—are precisely at issue in 
deciding what happened in Ferguson. And there is no reason to believe the 
results Kahan found would not be replicated with respect to these events. 
Had Officer Wilson been wearing a body camera when he encountered 
and shot Michael Brown, opinions about what the video “showed” almost 
certainly would split along political divisions about race, racial justice, 
police practices, and concepts of law and order. Similarly, viewer opinions 
about whether demonstrators were peacefully assembling or unlawfully 
rioting likely would track opinions about the First Amendment, public 
protest, the permissible use of the streets for expressive activity, and 
whether the incident being protested—the Brown shooting—was justified. 
Of course, the Supreme Court shows no sign of moving from its view 
that video can be (and often is) so conclusive and unambiguous that the 
court can determine its meaning and jury consideration is not required.
54
 
Paradoxically, body cameras may prove worse for civil rights plaintiffs—
more constitutional cases will feature video, offering courts more 
opportunities to misuse video evidence and more opportunities to keep 
cases away from civil juries. 
C. Implementation: The Devil in the Details 
The ultimate effectiveness of body cameras depends on the hard details 
of implementation. In particular, departments must enact policies covering 
everything about how cameras should be deployed and used. It is not 
enough to call for body cameras; public discussion must consider the 
difficult endeavor of making them work. 
That is the takeaway of a 2014 joint report from the Police Executive 
Research Forum and the United States Department of Justice’s 
Community Oriented Police Services Program. The report is the product 
of a yearlong study that included a survey of police departments, 
interviews with executives in departments that have implemented body 
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camera programs, and a one-day conference of law enforcement officials 
and other policy experts. It offers more than 30 recommendations of 
protocols for using cameras, recording events, and storing, reviewing, 
identifying, using, and releasing a potentially enormous volume of 
recordings. At its heart is recognition that department policies and training 
materials must provide clear, specific, and detailed guidelines.
55
 
Consider, for example, the debate over when officers should record. 
ACLU representatives argue that officers should record all encounters 
with the public, because continuous recording eliminates “any possibility 
that an officer could evade the recording of abuses committed on duty”; 
law enforcement officials want a more limited approach that leaves 
officers discretion to keep cameras off during certain encounters, as well 
as when recording would be “unsafe” or “impossible.”
56
 The report 
recommends that officers record “all calls for service and during all law 
enforcement-related encounters and activities that occur while the officer 
is on duty,” subject to a requirement that officers obtain consent from 
crime victims prior to recording and that officers retain discretion to keep 
cameras off when talking with victims, witnesses, or other people 
reporting crimes, particularly in sexual assault or child abuse cases.
57
 
While siding with the discretionary approach, the report also recommends 
that officers explain and justify their decision not to record a particular 
encounter.
58
 
Of course, leaving officers with such discretion may create a different 
unintended consequence—unreasonably heightened expectations 
producing more opportunities for dispute, complaint, and litigation. As 
police cameras become more pervasive, it becomes impossible to escape 
demands—from courts, litigants, juries, citizens, the media, and civilian 
review boards—that cameras always will be used, that video always will 
be available, and that the absence of video evidence is itself suspicious and 
suggestive of misconduct.
59
 They also may be disappointed when the 
video does not provide a single, unambiguous, commonly held 
understanding about what happened in an encounter. The absence, or 
ambiguity, of video will itself become a subject of controversy in the 
media, in police departments and local governments, and in court. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
My point is not to argue against body cameras. They offer numerous 
benefits and are likely a net positive, especially with members of the 
public increasingly armed with their own video-recording technology and 
increasingly concerned about police misconduct and excessive force. 
The point instead is that the public debate about body cameras must 
reflect the nuance and complexity of camera policy, grounded in the 
limitations of video evidence and the hard questions of implementation. 
The moral panic framework—in which policy responses are similarly 
erroneously touted as magic solutions that resolve all problems—
highlights the failure to recognize that complexity. And it should prompt 
government officials and all other stakeholders in the public debate to take 
a more cautious, realistic, and, likely, more effective approach to body 
cameras and to video evidence. 
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